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The focus of this paper is to study the effect of sovereign rating changes in the PIIGS (Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) national stock markets during the European sovereign debt 
crisis. In my research I find that (1) downgrades convey more information to the market than 
upgrades. (2) The reaction varies between countries; with only Greece having a significant 
market reaction on the event day and with Italy and Spain not having a discernible reaction to the 
announcements. (3) The reactions differ depending on the agency that subscribed the 
announcement, with only S&P downgrades producing a significant market reaction on the day of 
the announcement and with Moody’s and Fitch upgrades producing significant reaction but only 
the day after the announcement. (4) Finally, I establish that Greece downgrade announcements 
don’t spillover to Portuguese and Irish stock markets. 
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Sovereign ratings are grades that quantify the likelihood of default of a nation’s 
government but they also give important information to investors about the countries 
macroeconomic and political environment. Given the fact that investors and managed funds 
are becoming increasingly international and look for international diversification requiring 
greater and more accurate information, they see sovereign ratings as a major risk indicator 
for the country’s risk (Hooper et al., 2008). When that information is incorporated by the 
market it can have a large effect in the pool of investors since some institutional investors 
may only hold investment-grade instruments and also affect the private sector because as 
stated by Brooks et al. (2004, p.3) “The change of sovereign ratings is one such key event 
that may trigger substantial re-weighting of international portfolios.” Additionally, 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002, p.2) say “When a credit rating agency downgrades a 
country’s sovereign debt, all debt instruments in that country may have to be downgraded 
accordingly because of the sovereign ceiling doctrine.1” 
During the European sovereign debt crisis (2009-2014) rating agencies were under a 
lot of pressure from the public opinion and were criticized by their succession of 
downgrades in some European countries, predominantly the so called PIIGS (Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). This countries were characterized by high deficits and 
large debt, which contributed to increase the instability and particularly their already high 
borrowing costs working as a self-fulfilling prophecy, which drove some of them (Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece) to request external financial  assistance to avoid default on their 
sovereign debt. Previously the rating agencies had already been criticized by behaving pro-
cyclically, Ferri et al. (1999) demonstrated that during the pre and post-crisis periods in the 
East Asia crisis, rating agencies criteria weighted more in their qualitative assessment than 
in the economic fundamentals exacerbating the economic cycle. Furthermore, Reisen and 
von Maltzan (1999) point to the potential of ratings for attenuating the euphoria of investors 
if assigned early, but have been used wrongly by the agencies and contributing to the 
boom-bust cycles in the international financial markets. 
                                                 
1 States that in most countries and most situations the private sector cannot borrow in better terms than the 
government 
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 The majority of the current literature in credit ratings focuses on corporate rating 
announcements and their effects on bonds and individual stock. The research seems to 
indicate that positive announcements have no effect in either group but there seems to be a 
negative impact in both types of assets in the case of negative announcements. Norden and 
Weber (2004) present a summary of this literature, their data and results (see also Hull et al. 
(2004) and Goh and Ederington (1999). 
Although the majority of research focuses on corporate ratings there is a body of 
literature that focuses on the effects of sovereign credit ratings. It can be divided in several 
topics: studies that look to the determinants of the ratings like Cantor and Packer (1996) ; 
studies that research the effect on the bond markets (see Cantor and Packer (1996), Afonso 
et al. (2011), Reisen and von Maltzan (1999), Larraín et al. (1997). And lastly, studies that 
examine the effects of sovereign rating announcements on the stock markets (Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2002), Brooks et al. (2004), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), Ferreira and 
Gama (2007) and Hooper et al. (2008). My paper contributes to the research on the last 
category, analyzing the effect of sovereign rating changes in a small group of European 
countries national stock markets. 
 Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) studied the effect of rating and outlook changes 
for emerging markets and check for cross-country and cross-security spillover effects. They 
conclude that the rating announcements affect stock markets and generate cross-country 
contagion, stronger for neighboring countries. They also determine that the effect is 
stronger during crisis and for non-transparent economies. Lastly their results support the 
idea of pro-cyclical behavior by the rating agencies. Brooks et al. (2004) investigates the 
national stock market impact of sovereign rating changes by four rating agencies in the 
period of 1973 to 2001. They discover that only downgrades have wealth impact in the 
stock markets, and more surprisingly that only two of the agencies, S&P and Fitch produce 
a significant market reaction unlike Moody’s and Thomson (later merged with Fitch). 
Interestingly they also find that there is no significant different between emerging and 
developed economies in their reactions to the downgrades. Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) 
studies the price impact of rating changes in both the stock and bond market for 34 
countries in the period of 1990-2000. Their findings suggest that only bond markets react to 
rating upgrades and the stock markets only to negative announcements. Additionally bond 
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yields seem to anticipate downgrades, and downgrades mainly occur in market downturns 
which suggest pro-cyclical behavior by the rating agencies. Ferreira and Gama (2007) test 
the effect of sovereign debt and outlook changes of one country in other countries’ stock 
markets over the period of 1989 to 2003. They find a negative reaction in the case of 
downgrades, but conclude that upgrades do not convene any information to the market. 
They also find an inverse relation between the distance amongst the countries and the 
impact of the spillover, meaning neighboring countries returns are more impacted by the 
rating change. Furthermore emerging market status also has an amplifying effect on the 
spillover. Hooper et al. (2008) looked at the disaggregated impact of sovereign rating 
changes, including outlook changes in national stock markets of 42 countries in the period 
of 1995-2003. Their results show a stronger response in the returns and volatility of the 
stock markets to downgrades, foreign currency debt, in crisis periods and in high debt 
countries.  
 In this paper I examine the national stock impact of sovereign credit rating 
announcements in the European countries denominated PIIGS, which include Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. I will include rating and outlook changes of the three main 
rating agencies Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings2 in the 
period of 2009 to 2014, characterized by the European Sovereign Debt crisis. Furthermore I 
will also investigate if there is a different reaction by the market based on the agency that 
assigns the new rating or outlook and a possible contagion of Greek downgrades to 
Portugal and Ireland. This study complements earlier research on the effects of sovereign 
rating announcements on the stock markets, by studying a group of countries characterized 
by high deficits and large public debt in a unique context of a sovereign debt crisis. 
 My results indicate that negative announcements produce a larger effect on the 
stock markets than the positive ones and that the reaction varies with each country, with 
only Greece producing significant effect on the event day, the Portuguese and the Irish 
markets showing some response although not statistically significant and with Italy and 
Spain showing less severe reactions. Second, positive announcements don’t seem to 
produce a significant effect in any of the countries. Third, I found different reactions 
between each rating agency announcements, with only S&P producing a significant market 
                                                 
2 Henceforth addressed respectively as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch.  
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reaction on the day of the announcements in the case of downgrades and with Moody’s and 
Fitch producing a significant reaction in upgrades but on the following day. Fourth, 
downgrades in Greece don’t spillover to Portugal and Ireland stock markets. 
 The remainder of my paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes institutional 
features and gives an explanation of sovereign credit ratings. Section 3 presents the Data. 
Section 4 describes the methodology used in my empirical analysis. Section 5 shows my 
empirical analysis subdivided in three topics (analysis by country, analysis by rating agency 
and Greece contagion study) and section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Credit ratings 
 
Sovereign credit ratings are measures used to assess the probability of default or 
creditworthiness of a national government. It provides an indicator of the willingness and 
ability of the government’s on paying its debt based on the terms it was issued. The most 
widely recognized international rating agencies, whose ratings I study during my thesis are: 
Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). Combined these agencies hold almost the 
entirety of the market that can be classified as an oligopoly (Uwe Blaurock, 2007). 
Credit ratings are becoming increasingly important in the financial markets because 
of its growing lack of transparency with the globalization and establishment of more 
complex financial instruments that create the need for information from an independent 
source (Uwe Blaurock, 2007). Also due to its large influence it can affect the pool of 
investors, as noted in (Cantor and Packer, 1996, p.2) “many investors, particularly U.S. 
investors, prefer rated securities over unrated securities of apparently similar credit risk” 
and accordingly the governments seeks credit ratings to ease their access to capital. Ratings 
can be assigned for short-term and long-term obligations and can also be assigned 
separately for local or foreign currency. Rating agencies also provide information about 
possible short/mid-term evolutions on the ratings through two types of indicators: watches 
and outlooks, that have 3 possible scenarios to indicate the likelihood and direction of the 
change: positive, negative and stable.  
Although each rating agency uses different individual scales on their ratings they 
present vast similarities between them, using several bands that then are subdivided in 
notches (Table I). 
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Table I - Rating scales of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch 
Moody’s S&P Fitch Description 
Aaa AAA AAA Prime 
Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 AA+, AA, AA- AA+, AA, AA- High grade 
A1, A2, A3 A+, A, A- A+, A, A- Upper medium grade 
Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 BBB+, BBB, BBB- BBB+, BBB, BBB- Lower medium grade 
Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 BB+, BB, BB- BB+, BB, BB- 
Non-investment/ 
speculative grade 
B1, B2, B3 B+, B, B- B+, B, B- Highly speculative 
Caa1, Caa2, Caa3 CCC+, CCC, CCC- CCC Extremely speculative 
Ca CC CC Imminent default 
C R, SD, D C, RD, D Default 
  
It can be observed from the table that the ratings are graded in an ordinal order; 
therefore we can make comparisons between the ratings. For example we can conclude that 
A category ratings have less probability of default than the B or C categories.  
On the determination of the ratings, the rating agencies state that they use 
innumerous economic, social and political factors3. Even though the criteria can be 
somehow defined it is hard to perceive the weights that are given to each variable when 





 Data used on this paper consist of sovereign credit rating announcements that 
include rating and outlook changes that are collected from the period of January 1, 2009 to 
September 30, 2014. The list of the sovereign credit announcements is compiled from 
Bloomberg and comprehends the three main credit rating agencies Fitch Ratings, Standard 
& Poor’s and Moody’s Investor Services. The data set doesn’t provide information about 
the time of the announcement so there is some degree of uncertainty if the announcement is 
just before the end of the trading day or even after the market closes, which would mean 
                                                 
3 S&P, Fitch and Moody’s official websites 
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that the event could only produce an effect in the market after the event day (considering 
there’s no anticipation or information leakage).  
 Daily price indexes for each of the five countries and measured in euros are 
collected from Bloomberg. To calculate benchmark returns the MSCI EU Index is used as 
the proxy for the market returns. This index includes large and medium capitalized firms 
from 13 developed markets and 4 emerging markets from Europe. 
Table II makes a simple breakdown of the sample by country, agency and type of 
rating. It can be observed that during the sample period of less than 6 years there was an 
abnormally large number of rating announcements in a total of 126 for only 5 countries 
(illustratively, this makes an average of more than four ratings by country, each year, 
meaning the rating status changed roughly on average every 3 months) which demonstrates 
the political instability and the fluctuations of risk in the sovereign debt on this particular 
group of countries during this period. 
 
Table II - Summary of rating agency activity during the sample period 
 
Table II - This table contains all the sovereign rating events during the sample period across the three main 
rating agencies in the PIIGS countries. For simplification the announcements are only divided in Upgrades or 
Downgrades which include respectively all positive and negative announcements (i.e. outlook and watch 
changes). 
  
The ratings distribution is quite asymmetrical between the countries with Greece 
being the most re-rated country (35) and Italy the least re-rated (13) but all negative, unlike 
the other countries which by the end of the sample period (and closing their assistance 
programs in the case of Portugal and Ireland) started to have rating upgrades but with only 
 
Fitch S&P Moody’s Total 
(country) Upgrades Downgrades Upgrades Downgrades Upgrades Downgrades 
Portugal 0 5 2 9 2 7 25 
Ireland 3 7 2 7 2 7 28 
Italy 0 4 0 5 0 4 13 
Greece 3 10 3 10 0 9 35 
Spain 1 5 1 8 1 9 25 
Total 
(agency) 
7 31 8 39 5 36 126 
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Ireland being able to move from non-investment category to the upper levels. Interestingly 
Spain that was not under an external assistance program had more negative announcements 
than both Portugal and Ireland, showing high instability; nevertheless the rating, like 
Italy’s, never left the investment grade categories. This indicates a more reactive than 
predictive behavior by the rating agencies that only do severe downgrades after the 
countries ask for external help and acknowledge a possible short-term default. The more 
active agency was S&P with a total of 47 ratings, against the 41 and 38 re-ratings of 
Moody’s and Fitch respectively.  
 Due to the sample period being relatively small and being characterized by a lot of 
instability, there’s a high clustering of events which can be observed in Figure 1. This 
figure shows the number of events in each semester, with downgrades showed in negative. 
In 2011, the peak of the crisis, there were over 40 downgrades and between July 2010 and 
July 2012 there were almost 80 rating changes. This concentration of events may cause bias 
and “contamination” in my estimates of the announcements effects, so in my study I only 
use “clean windows”. In this case “clean windows” are 21-days event windows that don’t 
overlap, ensuring that I only study the effects of one announcement in each event.4 
 
 
Figure 1- Re-ratings in the PIIGS countries during the period of January 2009 to September 2014, divided by 
semesters. The downgrades are showed in negative and the upgrades in positive. 
 
                                                 
4 This method of decontamination was used previously on other studies (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; 
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 This clustering of events was mainly caused by the procyclical behavior of the 
rating agencies. While in Greece and Ireland their bailout requests occurred in 2010 with 
the downgrades lagging after it, in the case of Portugal the bailout was in April 2011 (the 
semester with more events in the graphic) and the downgrades occurred in great number 
before and around the bailout increasing the pressure of investors in Portugal bond yields, 
snowballing borrowing costs, public deficit and debt. This worked as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, placing rating agencies in the scope of public opinion being criticized by their 
role in aggravating the crisis in early 2011.  
 
4. Event study methodology 
 
 Event studies are used as common framework for testing the immediate impact of a 
specific event on prices in the financial markets and its degree of significance.5 In this 
paper I will employ this methodology to detect for abnormal returns around the 
announcements of the rating agencies.  
 I compute daily risk adjusted abnormal market returns from the conventional market 
model, which is considered to have the most powerful estimations and is the most common 
approach6: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡), 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on market i at day t , 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return on the MSCI EU index at day 
t, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the market model parameters obtained from an ordinary least squares 
regression.  
 I calculate the market model parameters based on an estimation window that ranges 
from 𝑇0=-120 to 𝑇1= -21 trading days before the event day, 𝑡=0. The event window spans 
between 𝑡1=-10 trading days before, to 𝑡2=10 days after the event.
7 This will allow us to 
capture a possible anticipation of the announcement or a delayed reaction by the market. 
                                                 
5 For a more comprehensive look on this methodology see MacKinlay (1997).  
6 MacKinlay (1997) presents the different models that can be applied on event studies  
7 I apply similar methodology to Brooks et al. (2004)  
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An average abnormal return is calculated for event date t as a simple cross-sectional 
average over N rating announcements in each country. 
 








where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is the abnormal return of event j on day t  for each country. Subsequently I 
calculate the variance of AR for each event, which is based on the variance of AR during 
the estimation window, and is given by: 
 
𝜎𝜖𝑖
2 =  
1













since I’m using “clean windows” and there’s no overlapping the across the events: 
 









Then I calculate the T-statistic under the hypothesis of no abnormal performance, assuming 
cross-sectional independence across the events. 
 A cumulative average abnormal return is then computed across the event window 
and the corresponding standard error: 
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a T-statistic is then calculated assuming the hypothesis of the abnormal returns being zero. 
The individual average abnormal returns are assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed and by the central limit theorem the sample of AAR’s will follow a normal 
distribution. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. Analysis by country  
 
I start my analysis of the effect of the rating announcements in the national stock 
markets of the PIIGS countries by plotting the graphic of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) by both positive and negative announcements during my event window, to see how 
the market trends around the announcements (Figure 2):  
 
Figure 2 - Cumulative abnormal returns disaggregated between positive and negative announcements from 
event day -10 to event day 10. The abnormal returns were obtained using the market model for the normal 
return measure. 
 
In the case of the negative announcements, there seems to be some degree of 
anticipation by the markets with a small decline on returns on the day before the event and 
greater drop on the event day. For the positive events, the market seems to have even a 
higher degree of anticipation with returns starting to rise five days before the event, then on 
the event day there’s a drop followed by a new rise in returns and unexpectedly after day 3 
the returns continue to fall until the last day of the event window leading to a highly 













Negative announcements Positive announcements
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which influence largely the aggregated results because of the small size of the sample (13 
events). Considering this I decided to plot the graph for positive announcements but this 
time without the data from Portugal upgrades, the results are shown on Figure 3. Analyzing 
the graphic it can be observed that until day 3 both graphics are similar but after that the 
data from Portugal ends up influencing the aggregated results producing very negative 
CARs on the last days of the event window. My results are consistent with Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) and Brooks et al. (2004) who also found a negative reaction in the event 
day for negative announcements. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Cumulative abnormal for the positive announcements from event day -10 to event day 10. The 
abnormal returns were obtained using the market model for the normal return measure. The full line contains 
the CAR excluding Portugal data and the dashed line 
 
Figure 4 shows the CARs for negative announcements disaggregated by country. It 
can be observed a similar pattern across all countries around the event date with a 
substantial drop in returns in the event day (except for Italy, which doesn´t have any 
perceivable trend). After that, with the exception of Greece the market seems to “correct” 
with an increase in returns in the following days. But unexpectedly the positive trend 
continues, particularly after day 7, in all the countries with the exception of Greece leading 
to positive CARs, although not statistically significant this trend is unexpected but may be 












Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Positive 
announcements
Without Portugal With Portugal
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Figure 4 - Cumulative abnormal returns for negative announcements disaggregated by country from event 
day -10 to event day 10. The abnormal returns were obtained using the market model for the normal return 
measure 
 
During this crisis downgrades were usually triggered by negative economic and 
budget predictions or political failure to implement corrective measures. Governments, in 
an attempt to halt the downward trend would then announce new corrective and economic 
measures to solve the problems and the markets would regain confidence and react 
positively, in this case on average after seven trading days, which would explain this 
positive trend. It would also make sense to why Greece is excluded from this tendency, 
since it was the country with least political consensus and would take more time for the 
Government to announce measures. Quite possibly there is a factor of trust, whereby the 
Greek government was discredited to such an event that the markets would not trust 
measures would be approved or applied. To be noted that I did not test for this effect, but 
recalling news following the rating announcement days reveal this trend of political 
response to the downgrades which had a lot of media attention during this period. 
To analyze more thoroughly the effects of the rating announcements in the stock 
markets of each country, I will be looking to the daily average abnormal returns across the 
21-day event window for both the negative and positive announcements as reported, 
respectively, in Table III and Table IV. As I mentioned previously in the Data section, there 
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day. Considering my results I feel that this issue should not have a large effect on the 
returns (at least on downgrades), as it can be observed on Table III, e.g., Greece only has a 
significant market reaction on day zero. Examining the tables it can easily be perceived that 
there are clear differences in the “own-market” reaction between each country. 
 Portugal’s market seems to have a high degree of anticipation in their rating 
downgrades, starting to have negative returns two days before the announcement, reaching 
its peak (-0.76%) on the event day, followed by a late reaction on the next day. In the 
second day following the announcement the market seems to start to return to normal levels 
with a significant positive abnormal return (1.30%) and reaching a positive CAAR. In the 
case of rating upgrades Portugal presents a negative return on the event day and significant 
negative returns on day 3 to 6 and day 8 and leading to significant negative CAARs after 
day 4. These results, as I previously stated end up influencing the aggregated results I 
calculated previously due to the small sample. Also the fact the sample is also very small 
for Portugal (3 events) makes me believe that this behavior of the abnormal returns is 
unrelated to the rating announcement and caused by other external factors. 
Italy, which only has negative announcements on my study period, presents 
puzzling results, having a positive return on the event day but having progressively higher 
negative returns in day 1 and 2 and a significant negative abnormal return three days after 
the announcement (-1.29%). On day 4 there’s a positive significant reaction on the next day 
to correct a possible “overreaction”. This seems to indicate a somewhat late reaction of the 
market, possibly exacerbated by announcements after trading hours.  
Ireland abnormal returns in the negative announcements present some anticipation 
of the announcement with negative returns on day -2 and -1 followed by a higher negative 
abnormal return on the event day with positive returns on the subsequent days, leading  to a 
positive CAAR at the end of the event window. For the positive announcements there is a 
positive abnormal return on the event day followed by a higher positive reaction on the 
following day caused by a late reaction or possibly the timing of the announcements.  
Greece is the country that presents the most significant reaction in the event day (-
1.29%) for negative announcements, but unlike Portugal or Ireland it doesn’t present any 
trend of anticipation which can explain the more severe reaction on the announcement day. 
Greece is also the only country in the sample that present a negative CAAR at the end of 
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the event window (-2.71%). For the positive announcements Greece presents positive 
returns from day -1 to day 1, indicating some anticipation to the upgrades. 
Spain downgrades don’t produce a significant reaction on the announcement day (-
0.25%) only presenting a relative negative reaction two days after the event, but overall the 
rating downgrade doesn’t seem to be very impactful on the Spanish national stock market. 
The rating upgrades produce a negative reaction on the event day followed by a positive 
reaction on the next two days, which seem to indicate a late reaction of the market or 
possibly the timing of the announcements. 
I theorize that the reason beyond the results of Italy and Spain regarding the 
downgrades (which do not have a large impact on the event day), is the fact that the ratings 
of these two countries were never under the Investment-grade level, which like I 
commented on earlier may have a huge effect on demand of financial products of the 
country and consequently on prices. 
 
5.2. Analysis by rating agencies 
 
Rating agencies report that they utilize several factors to determine the sovereign 
ratings of the countries, but they are all very similar between each other and theoretically 
there should be no differences between the effects that each other’s announcements produce 
in the countries “own-market” wealth, but previous literature (see Brooks et al. (2004) has 
found differences between how different agencies announcements affect the markets so I 
decided to conduct and analysis by rating agency to see if I would find similar results. My 
results are reported on Figure 5, which plots the cumulative abnormal returns by rating 
agencies for the negative announcements, and Table V that shows the average abnormal 
returns across the event window by rating agency for both positive and negative events.  
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 Table III - Average Abnormal returns across the event window by country (negative announcements)  
 
Table III - This table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) computed through the market model as a benchmark for normal returns and their statistical significance, 
across the whole event window and disaggregated by each of the 5 countries of the sample for negative announcements. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 







Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain 
AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat 
-10 -0,16% -0,33 -0,16% -0,33 -0,21% -0,32 -0,21% -0,32 -0,35% -0,58 -0,35% -0,58 -0,03% -0,06 -0,03% -0,06 -0,60% -1,14 -0,60% -1,14 
-9 0,50% 1,03 0,34% 0,50 0,24% 0,36 0,03% 0,03 -0,66% -1,08 -1,01% -1,17 0,36% 0,63 0,33% 0,41 0,13% 0,24 -0,48% -0,64 
-8 0,03% 0,06 0,37% 0,44 0,48% 0,72 0,51% 0,44 -0,60% -0,99 -1,61% -1,53 -0,57% -1,01 -0,24% -0,25 0,48% 0,91 0,01% 0,01 
-7 -0,34% -0,70 0,03% 0,03 -0,34% -0,51 0,17% 0,12 0,62% 1,02 -0,99% -0,81 0,06% 0,10 -0,19% -0,17 0,08% 0,14 0,08% 0,08 
-6 0,23% 0,48 0,26% 0,24 -0,66% -0,99 -0,49% -0,33 0,18% 0,29 -0,82% -0,60 -0,12% -0,22 -0,31% -0,25 -0,24% -0,45 -0,16% -0,13 
-5 0,74% 1,51 1,00% 0,84 -0,69% -1,03 -1,18% -0,72 0,44% 0,72 -0,38% -0,25 -0,39% -0,69 -0,70% -0,50 0,11% 0,21 -0,05% -0,04 
-4 0,35% 0,71 1,35% 1,04 0,20% 0,29 -0,98% -0,56 0,44% 0,72 0,06% 0,04 -0,30% -0,53 -1,00% -0,67 -0,33% -0,63 -0,38% -0,27 
-3 -0,08% -0,17 1,27% 0,92 2,14% 3,21** 1,15% 0,61 0,31% 0,51 0,37% 0,22 -0,23% -0,41 -1,23% -0,77 0,13% 0,24 -0,25% -0,17 
-2 -0,51% -1,04 0,76% 0,52 0,16% 0,24 1,32% 0,66 -0,19% -0,31 0,18% 0,10 1,03% 1,81* -0,21% -0,12 0,38% 0,72 0,13% 0,08 
-1 -0,55% -1,12 0,21% 0,14 0,35% 0,52 1,66% 0,79 -0,03% -0,05 0,15% 0,08 0,11% 0,19 -0,10% -0,05 -0,03% -0,06 0,10% 0,06 
0 -0,76% -1,55 -0,55% -0,34 0,43% 0,64 2,09% 0,95 -0,68% -1,12 -0,53% -0,26 -1,29% -2,28** -1,39% -0,74 -0,25% -0,48 -0,15% -0,09 
1 -0,50% -1,03 -1,05% -0,62 -0,06% -0,09 2,03% 0,88 0,69% 1,13 0,16% 0,08 -0,24% -0,43 -1,63% -0,83 0,22% 0,42 0,07% 0,04 
2 1,30% 2,66** 0,25% 0,14 -0,43% -0,65 1,60% 0,67 0,93% 1,53 1,09% 0,50 -0,38% -0,66 -2,00% -0,98 -0,72% -1,35 -0,65% -0,34 
3 0,07% 0,15 0,32% 0,18 -1,42% -2,13* 0,18% 0,07 -0,17% -0,27 0,92% 0,40 -0,04% -0,07 -2,04% -0,96 -0,13% -0,24 -0,78% -0,39 
4 0,12% 0,24 0,44% 0,23 1,14% 1,71* 1,32% 0,51 0,26% 0,42 1,18% 0,50 0,90% 1,59 -1,14% -0,52 0,32% 0,61 -0,45% -0,22 
5 -0,29% -0,60 0,15% 0,07 -0,70% -1,05 0,62% 0,23 -0,17% -0,28 1,01% 0,41 0,56% 0,99 -0,58% -0,26 -0,03% -0,05 -0,48% -0,23 
6 -0,06% -0,13 0,08% 0,04 0,68% 1,02 1,30% 0,47 0,55% 0,90 1,56% 0,62 -0,07% -0,12 -0,65% -0,28 -0,48% -0,91 -0,96% -0,44 
7 0,19% 0,39 0,27% 0,13 -0,50% -0,74 0,81% 0,28 -0,12% -0,20 1,44% 0,56 -1,02% -1,79* -1,67% -0,69 -0,88% -1,66* -1,84% -0,82 
8 -0,67% -1,38 -0,40% -0,19 0,87% 1,30 1,67% 0,58 0,55% 0,91 1,99% 0,75 -0,69% -1,22 -2,36% -0,96 0,79% 1,50 -1,05% -0,45 
9 1,14% 2,33** 0,74% 0,34 0,96% 1,44 2,63% 0,88 0,09% 0,14 2,08% 0,76 -0,97% -1,72* -3,33% -1,32 0,88% 1,66* -0,17% -0,07 
10 -0,11% -0,23 0,63% 0,41 0,30% 0,44 2,93% 1,39 0,01% 0,02 2,09% 1,09 0,62% 1,10 -2,71% -1,51 1,09% 2,06** 0,92% 0,55 
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Table IV- This table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) computed through the market model as a benchmark for normal returns and their statistical significance, across 
the whole event window and disaggregated by each of the 5 countries of the sample for positive announcements. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
** Denotes statistical significance ate the 5% level   
Event day 
Positive announcements   
Portugal Ireland Greece Spain 
AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat 
-10 0,76% 1,27 0,76% 1,27 0,02% 0,03 0,02% 0,03 -0,34% -0,35 -0,34% -0,35 0,46% 0,67 0,46% 0,67 
-9 -0,29% -0,48 0,47% 0,56 0,64% 1,04 0,66% 0,76 0,07% 0,07 -0,26% -0,19 -1,26% -1,84 -0,80% -0,83 
-8 0,42% 0,70 0,90% 0,86 0,72% 1,17 1,39% 1,29 -1,04% -1,07 -1,30% -0,78 -0,19% -0,28 -0,99% -0,84 
-7 1,77% 2,93** 2,66% 2,21** -0,82% -1,32 0,57% 0,46 1,17% 1,21 -0,13% -0,07 -0,23% -0,34 -1,23% -0,90 
-6 -0,23% -0,39 2,43% 1,80* 0,46% 0,74 1,02% 0,74 -1,29% -1,34 -1,42% -0,66 -0,43% -0,62 -1,65% -1,08 
-5 0,04% 0,06 2,46% 1,67* -0,42% -0,69 0,60% 0,39 -0,43% -0,44 -1,85% -0,78 0,87% 1,27 -0,78% -0,47 
-4 0,04% 0,07 2,51% 1,57 1,07% 1,73* 1,67% 1,02 0,90% 0,93 -0,95% -0,37 -0,06% -0,08 -0,84% -0,47 
-3 0,06% 0,10 2,57% 1,51 0,23% 0,37 1,90% 1,08 0,99% 1,02 0,03% 0,01 0,22% 0,33 -0,62% -0,32 
-2 0,16% 0,26 2,73% 1,51 -0,24% -0,38 1,66% 0,90 -0,27% -0,28 -0,24% -0,08 -0,11% -0,16 -0,72% -0,35 
-1 0,24% 0,40 2,97% 1,56 -0,83% -1,34 0,83% 0,42 1,14% 1,18 0,91% 0,30 0,10% 0,15 -0,62% -0,29 
0 -0,71% -1,17 2,26% 1,13 0,18% 0,29 1,01% 0,49 0,06% 0,06 0,97% 0,30 -0,81% -1,19 -1,44% -0,63 
1 0,24% 0,40 2,50% 1,20 0,88% 1,42 1,89% 0,88 1,32% 1,37 2,29% 0,68 0,57% 0,84 -0,86% -0,36 
2 -0,92% -1,53 1,58% 0,73 -0,01% -0,01 1,88% 0,84 0,03% 0,03 2,32% 0,67 0,82% 1,20 -0,04% -0,02 
3 -3,46% -5,74** -1,88% -0,83 0,16% 0,26 2,04% 0,88 -0,80% -0,83 1,52% 0,42 -0,22% -0,33 -0,27% -0,10 
4 -2,07% -3,43** -3,94% -1,69* 0,85% 1,37 2,89% 1,20 -2,13% -2,21 -0,61% -0,16 -0,33% -0,48 -0,59% -0,22 
5 -1,43% -2,38** -5,37% -2,23** -0,85% -1,38 2,03% 0,82 0,09% 0,10 -0,51% -0,13 -0,36% -0,52 -0,95% -0,35 
6 -0,25% -0,42 -5,62% -2,27** 0,02% 0,04 2,05% 0,80 0,90% 0,93 0,38% 0,10 -1,25% -1,82 -2,19% -0,78 
7 0,14% 0,23 -5,48% -2,15** 0,53% 0,85 2,58% 0,98 -3,10% -3,21 -2,72% -0,66 0,83% 1,21 -1,37% -0,47 
8 -1,72% -2,86** -7,21% -2,75** 0,18% 0,29 2,76% 1,02 -1,00% -1,03 -3,71% -0,88 1,17% 1,71 -0,20% -0,07 
9 -0,86% -1,43 -8,07% -3,00** 0,14% 0,22 2,90% 1,05 -0,52% -0,54 -4,23% -0,98 -0,16% -0,24 -0,36% -0,12 
10 -0,55% -0,91 -8,62% -4,52** -0,48% -0,77 2,42% 1,24 0,01% 0,01 -4,22% -1,38 -0,41% -0,60 -0,77% -0,36 
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Figure 5 - Cumulative abnormal returns for negative announcements disaggregated by rating agencies from 
event day -10 to event day 10. The abnormal returns were obtained using the market model for the normal 
return measure 
 
Analyzing Figure 5 we can see that Moody’s has a clear “anticipation” trend, with 
returns starting two days before the announcement and continuing to drop until day 3. On 
the other side of the spectrum, S&P and Fitch announcements don’t show any anticipation 
by the markets or late reaction, only dropping on the event day, then in the last days of the 
event window their CAR’s start to rise and finish with high positive values (with Fitch’s 
value being statistically significant on day 10). I believe, as I previously stated, that this 
may be caused by the fact that during this crisis downgrades were usually triggered by 
negative economic and budget predictions or political failure of corrective measures, 
Governments aware of this and to respond to the growing instability would then 
announcement new corrective and economic measures to solve the problems and the 
markets would regain confidence and react positively, in this case on average after seven 
trading days, which would explain this positive trend. Again, to be noted that I didn´t test 
for this effect but seems like an explanation that may fit these results.  
Regarding Table 5, in the case of the negative announcements, only S&P ratings 
produce a significant abnormal return on the event (-0.80%), while in the case of Fitch the 
reaction is negative but  not significant. In the case of Moody’s there seems to be an 
anticipation of the announcement on the day before, followed by a larger reaction on day 1 














Cumulative AR by Rating Agency  - negative announcements
Moody's CAR S&P CAR Fitch CAR
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Table V - Average Abnormal returns across the event window by Rating Agency 
 
Table V- This table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) computed through the market model as a benchmark for normal returns and their statistical significance, across 
the whole event window and disaggregated by rating agency and for positive and negative announcements. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 




Negative announcements Positive announcements 
Moody's S&P Fitch Moody's S&P Fitch 
AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat 
-10 -0,21% -0,50 -0,21% -0,50 -0,53% -1,30 -0,53% -1,30 -0,22% -0,40 -0,22% -0,40 0,33% 0,75 0,33% 0,75 0,71% 0,79 0,71% 0,79 -0,63% -0,86 -0,63% -0,86 
-9 0,19% 0,45 -0,02% -0,04 0,18% 0,45 -0,35% -0,61 -0,05% -0,08 -0,27% -0,34 -0,32% -0,75 0,00% 0,00 0,76% 0,85 1,47% 1,16 -0,49% -0,66 -1,12% -1,08 
-8 0,48% 1,14 0,46% 0,63 -0,24% -0,58 -0,59% -0,83 -0,62% -1,09 -0,89% -0,91 0,21% 0,48 0,21% 0,28 0,42% 0,47 1,89% 1,22 -0,77% -1,05 -1,89% -1,49 
-7 0,09% 0,22 0,55% 0,65 0,20% 0,49 -0,39% -0,48 -0,19% -0,34 -1,08% -0,95 0,56% 1,29 0,77% 0,88 0,23% 0,25 2,12% 1,18 0,63% 0,86 -1,26% -0,86 
-6 -0,37% -0,88 0,18% 0,19 -0,17% -0,41 -0,55% -0,61 0,14% 0,25 -0,94% -0,74 0,28% 0,65 1,05% 1,08 0,00% 0,00 2,12% 1,06 -1,58% -2,15 -2,84% -1,73* 
-5 -0,31% -0,73 -0,13% -0,13 0,06% 0,14 -0,50% -0,50 0,34% 0,59 -0,61% -0,44 -0,25% -0,58 0,80% 0,75 0,28% 0,31 2,40% 1,09 -0,35% -0,48 -3,19% -1,77* 
-4 0,32% 0,76 0,19% 0,17 0,30% 0,75 -0,19% -0,18 -0,45% -0,80 -1,06% -0,70 0,12% 0,28 0,92% 0,80 0,59% 0,66 2,99% 1,26 1,23% 1,67* -1,96% -1,01 
-3 0,39% 0,92 0,58% 0,49 0,95% 2,32** 0,75% 0,65 0,05% 0,09 -1,01% -0,63 -0,13% -0,29 0,79% 0,65 -0,54% -0,60 2,46% 0,97 2,07% 2,81* 0,10% 0,05 
-2 -0,01% -0,01 0,57% 0,45 0,13% 0,33 0,89% 0,73 0,94% 1,65 -0,07% -0,04 -0,15% -0,35 0,64% 0,49 0,09% 0,10 2,54% 0,95 -0,33% -0,45 -0,23% -0,10 
-1 -0,29% -0,70 0,28% 0,21 0,57% 1,40 1,46% 1,13 -0,18% -0,31 -0,25% -0,14 -0,46% -1,06 0,18% 0,13 -0,23% -0,25 2,31% 0,82 1,34% 1,83* 1,11% 0,48 
0 -0,21% -0,50 0,07% 0,05 -0,80% -1,96** 0,66% 0,49 -0,60% -1,06 -0,84% -0,45 -0,49% -1,13 -0,31% -0,22 -0,39% -0,44 1,92% 0,65 0,31% 0,42 1,43% 0,58 
1 -0,65% -1,53 -0,58% -0,39 0,36% 0,88 1,02% 0,72 0,33% 0,59 -0,51% -0,26 0,85% 1,97** 0,54% 0,36 0,00% 0,00 1,92% 0,62 1,60% 2,18** 3,02% 1,19 
2 -0,12% -0,28 -0,69% -0,46 -0,14% -0,34 0,88% 0,60 0,77% 1,35 0,25% 0,12 -0,42% -0,98 0,12% 0,07 -0,62% -0,69 1,31% 0,40 0,89% 1,21 3,91% 1,48 
3 -0,23% -0,54 -0,92% -0,58 -0,17% -0,43 0,70% 0,46 -0,35% -0,61 -0,09% -0,04 -1,23% -2,84** -1,12% -0,69 -2,23% -2,49** -0,92% -0,28 0,42% 0,58 4,34% 1,58 
4 0,17% 0,40 -0,75% -0,46 0,43% 1,07 1,14% 0,72 1,30% 2,29** 1,21% 0,55 -1,43% -3,30** -2,55% -1,52 -0,71% -0,79 -1,63% -0,47 -0,49% -0,67 3,84% 1,35 
5 0,36% 0,84 -0,40% -0,23 -0,23% -0,57 0,91% 0,56 -0,18% -0,32 1,03% 0,45 -1,27% -2,92** -3,82% -2,20** 0,26% 0,29 -1,37% -0,38 -0,69% -0,94 3,15% 1,07 
6 -0,28% -0,67 -0,68% -0,39 0,29% 0,71 1,19% 0,71 0,18% 0,32 1,21% 0,52 -0,56% -1,30 -4,38% -2,45** 0,50% 0,56 -0,87% -0,24 0,31% 0,43 3,46% 1,14 
7 -0,50% -1,17 -1,17% -0,66 -0,41% -1,02 0,78% 0,45 -0,69% -1,21 0,52% 0,22 0,62% 1,43 -3,76% -2,04** -1,50% -1,68* -2,37% -0,62 -1,33% -1,81* 2,14% 0,68 
8 -0,94% -2,22** -2,11% -1,15 0,48% 1,19 1,26% 0,71 1,18% 2,07** 1,70% 0,68 -0,74% -1,72* -4,50% -2,38** -1,23% -1,38 -3,60% -0,92 0,64% 0,87 2,77% 0,87 
9 0,63% 1,49 -1,48% -0,79 0,58% 1,42 1,84% 1,01 -0,21% -0,37 1,48% 0,58 -0,56% -1,29 -5,06% -2,61** -0,98% -1,10 -4,58% -1,15 0,57% 0,78 3,34% 1,02 
10 0,35% 0,83 -1,13% -0,85 0,08% 0,20 1,92% 1,49 1,50% 2,63** 2,98% 1,66* -0,66% -1,53 -5,73% -4,17** -0,70% -0,78 -5,28% -1,87* 0,45% 0,61 3,79% 1,63 
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For positive announcements there are also differences between the agencies, with 
S&P not producing any discernible reaction in the market around the event for negative 
downgrades, while Moody’s and Fitch announcements producing a significant reaction on 
the day after the event. In the case of Moody’s and considering the results for the negative 
announcements that finds a larger reaction on day 1 as well, I´m inclined to believe that 
Moody’s generally announces the rating changes close to the end of the trading hours or 
even after the trading closes. Even though my research didn’t reveal any specific time by 
any agency to do the announcement, this explanation for this case is more consistent with 
my results. 
My results are consistent with Brooks et al. (2004) which finds different reactions 
by the market based on the agency that subscribed the announcement, they find that S&P 
and Fitch downgrades produced larger market downfalls than the other agencies. I 
concluded like them that S&P downgrades produce more significant market downfalls, but 
my results differ from their work since Fitch didn’t produce a significant market reaction in 
my results. 
5.3. Greece “contagion” study 
 
During the crisis one of the main concerns of the political authorities and the 
investors were the possible “contagion” of the political and economic situation that 
subsisted in Greece to other European countries, particularly the countries that were also 
under financial assistance, Portugal and Ireland. Considering this issue I decided to study 
the effects of Greece downgrade announcements on the stock markets of the countries that 
theoretically should be more “sensitive” to them, Portugal and Ireland, but only in the 
period after the Greek bailout, when the issue of contagion was brought up by the markets 
and European political authorities. I decided to only study the effect of negative 
announcements, since previous literature (see Ferreira and Gama (2007), concluded that 
rating upgrades did not have significant effect on foreign countries. I used event studies, as 
formerly used in Kaminsky & Schmukler (2002), with the same methodology I apply on 
the rest of my paper. I start my analysis by plotting the graphic of cumulative abnormal 
returns for Portugal, Ireland and a dashed line with Greece own-market reaction, to the 
post-bailout negative announcements (Fig. 6). 
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Figure 6 - Cumulative abnormal returns for Greece downgrades, in the own country (dotted line), Portugal 
and Ireland. The abnormal returns were obtained using the market model for the normal return measure. 
Analyzing the results of Portugal and comparing them to Greece own-market 
reaction, we can see that the Greek downgrades are not very impactful in the Portuguese 
national stock market, only with a small decrease in returns after day 1 until day 3. 
Concerning Ireland the results show even less impact by the downgrades in the Irish 
market, with no perceivable trend around the event and even an increase of returns in the 
days around the event. 
 For a more detailed analysis of the effects of Greek downgrades on the Portuguese 
and Irish markets, I will analyze the average abnormal returns (AAR’s) across the 21-day 
event window reported in Table 6.  
The Portuguese market does not show strong reaction to the Greek downgrades, 
having positive abnormal returns on the day of the event, followed by a small decrease in 
returns in the following days although not significant. The Irish market also doesn’t seem to 
suffer any impact by the downgrades in the fellow European country, showing a positive 
return on the event day and the next day, followed by negative abnormal returns in the 



















Cumulative abnormal returns - Greece negative announcements 
Portugal Ireland Greece
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Table VI - Average abnormal returns for Greece negative announcements in Portugal and Ireland  
 
Table 6 - This table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) computed through the 
market model as a benchmark for normal returns and their statistical significance, across the whole event window and disaggregated by 
rating agency and for positive and negative announcements. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
** Denotes statistical significance ate the 5% level 
  
These results are surprising given that previous literature (see Ferreira and Gama 
(2007) and Kaminsky & Schmukler (2002) found that rating downgrades in one country 
spilled over to other markets, and that the results were stronger for neighboring countries 
and undeveloped economies (conditions that don’t apply in this case), the fact that these 
countries share the same currency and belong to a “single” economic area should 
compensate for this fact. Also the fact that these countries shared financial assistance and 
the same economic problems (high deficit, high debt and recession) in which the 
performance of one country could impact directly the political and economic measures 
taken in the other ones, increases my surprise with these results. Effectively, my results 
show that the downgrades on Greece debt did not produce any effect on the stock markets 
of Portugal and Greece (government bond yields could be a different issue) and the 
contagion risk that was so discussed by political authorities, the “markets” and the media 
did not really exist (at least on the stock markets). 
Event day 
Greece negative announcements 
Portugal Ireland 
AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat AAR t-stat CAAR t-stat 
-10 -0,37% -0,90 -0,37% -0,90 -0,02% -0,04 -0,02% -0,04 
-9 0,21% 0,53 -0,15% -0,26 0,21% 0,50 0,20% 0,33 
-8 -0,30% -0,75 -0,46% -0,65 0,10% 0,23 0,29% 0,40 
-7 -0,14% -0,34 -0,59% -0,73 -0,49% -1,16 -0,20% -0,24 
-6 -0,24% -0,60 -0,84% -0,92 0,24% 0,57 0,04% 0,04 
-5 -0,88% -2,17** -1,72% -1,73* -0,45% -1,06 -0,41% -0,39 
-4 -0,26% -0,65 -1,98% -1,85* -0,44% -1,03 -0,84% -0,75 
-3 0,07% 0,16 -1,92% -1,67* 0,47% 1,12 -0,37% -0,31 
-2 0,87% 2,15** -1,05% -0,86 0,44% 1,03 0,07% 0,05 
-1 0,51% 1,26 -0,53% -0,42 0,13% 0,31 0,20% 0,15 
0 0,20% 0,50 -0,33% -0,24 0,25% 0,59 0,45% 0,32 
1 -0,07% -0,17 -0,40% -0,28 0,18% 0,43 0,63% 0,43 
2 -0,06% -0,15 -0,46% -0,31 -0,09% -0,22 0,54% 0,35 
3 -0,03% -0,08 -0,49% -0,32 -0,42% -0,99 0,12% 0,07 
4 1,04% 2,55** 0,55% 0,35 -0,18% -0,43 -0,07% -0,04 
5 -0,35% -0,86 0,20% 0,12 -0,38% -0,91 -0,45% -0,27 
6 0,16% 0,39 0,36% 0,21 -0,25% -0,58 -0,70% -0,40 
7 -0,42% -1,04 -0,06% -0,04 -0,13% -0,30 -0,82% -0,46 
8 -0,67% -1,66* -0,74% -0,42 -0,66% -1,57 -1,49% -0,81 
9 -0,40% -0,98 -1,13% -0,62 -0,60% -1,41 -2,08% -1,10 
10 -0,57% -1,40 -1,70% -1,33 -0,34% -0,79 -2,42% -1,81* 




In this paper I study the “own-market” impact of sovereign rating changes from the 
three main agencies Moody’s, S&P and Fitch in the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece and Spain) during the European sovereign debt crisis using standard event 
study methodology. While the impact of sovereign rating changes and their effect on the 
stock markets has already been in the scope of past literature, my paper focuses on a group 
of countries with unusually high debt and persistent public deficits during a sovereign debt 
crisis which is a period where the sovereign ratings gain special importance. To complete 
my paper I also study the impact of Greek debt downgrades in the other two countries of 
this group (Portugal and Ireland) that were or would eventually be under financial 
assistance to check for possible contagion effects on their national stock markets. 
First, my results show that negative announcements only produce a significant 
effect on the event day in Greek own-market returns and that even though not statistically 
significant, there is a strong but not statistically significant effect on returns in Portugal and 
Ireland around the event day with an anticipation of the event by the stock market, which 
may have weakened the impact in the day of the announcement. The reaction seems to be 
somewhat less severe in the case of Italy and Spain, I believe that this was caused by the 
fact that unlike the other three countries, the ratings of Italy and Spain were never under the 
Investment-grade level, which may have a significant effect on demand of financial 
products of the country and consequently on prices, resulting on a minor impact in these 
two countries. Second, upgrades do not seem to produce any significant effect on the event 
day in any of the countries, although Ireland and Greece returns show some positive but not 
statistically significant reaction on the following day. Third, I found that only S&P 
downgrades produce a significant market reaction on the event day, even though the other 
agencies ratings seem to also have an effect on the stock markets (Moody’s particularly on 
the following day). In the case of the upgrades I found that Moody’s and Fitch produce a 
statistically significant reaction but only on the day following the announcement, this allied 
with previous results made me question the timing of the announcements, particularly in the 
case of Moody’s which seems to make the announcements after or close to the end of the 
trading day. Fourth, I investigated the effect of rating downgrades of Greece in Portuguese 
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and Irish markets and I found that these announcements do not produce any discernible 
effect on these countries’ stock markets. 
Future research on this topic could focus to the analysis of the countries 
characteristics vs rating effects, i.e. see if and how the Debt level, Predicted public deficit, 
inflation, unemployment, sovereign rating tier and other economic factors cause different 
interactions in the way rating announcements affect that countries’ stock market. This may 
indicate more precisely why there are differences in the way Italy and Spain reacted to the 
announcements compared to Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Moreover, future studies on this 
crisis could check if there are particular differences in the way this group of countries 
reacted to the announcements before and during the crisis to see, like past research 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) and Hooper et al. 
(2008), if the rating agencies helped exacerbate the economic cycle in this crisis. Last of all, 
studies on the determinants of the ratings and a “study” of reputation, may help to clarify 
why the markets react so differently to the announcements depending on the agency that 
subscribes them.  
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